


















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2900 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 
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model and the only cost of default. The anticipation of such losses alone may distort firms’ 
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result of pure self-fulfilling beliefs. Finally, we examine alternative interventions to restore 
the efficiency of equilibria. 
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Financial markets play an important role in the e¢ cient allocation of resources. One im-
portant function of ￿nancial markets is to provide the price signals that guide investment
decisions. If a ￿rm￿ s market value is distorted, the ￿rm￿ s investment decisions will also be
distorted. In this paper, we present a general equilibrium model in which debt-￿nanced ￿rms
face the risk of bankruptcy in some states of nature.1 As a consequence, the current market
value of a ￿rm also depends on the price at which the ￿rm￿ s assets can be liquidated in states
where default occurs.
The e¢ cient markets hypothesis requires, inter alia, that markets for ￿nancial assets are
liquid, both in the sense that prices are insensitive to the volume of trades and in the sense
that traders are not liquidity constrained. In the event of default, creditors are paid o⁄with
the proceeds from the immediate sale of the borrower￿ s assets. The immediacy of the sale
implies that buyers in the market may be constrained by the amount of liquid assets in their
possession. In that case, the asset prices re￿ ect the liquidity (or illiquidity) of the market,
as well the assets￿future returns. If the borrowers￿assets are sold at ￿re sale prices in an
illiquid market, creditors may su⁄er a signi￿cant loss. The anticipation of such a loss will
in turn increase the cost of borrowing, reduce the ￿rm￿ s initial investment, and a⁄ect the
￿rm￿ s technology choices. We consider a model in which the possible loss through a ￿re sale
is the only channel through which the ￿rm￿ s decision can be distorted. There are no other
costs of default and no other events in which liquidity is a substantive consideration.
The possibilities of default and of illiquid asset markets are intimately tied up with the
incompleteness of markets. We consider an environment in which there are no commitment
issues. Hence, if markets are complete, there is no need for default: borrowers and lenders can
achieve whatever state-contingent incomes they want by trading contingent claims. When
markets are complete, there is never a shortage of liquidity and assets are always e¢ ciently
priced. By contrast, if the available debt instruments do not allow for state contingent
payments, it is possible that, in some states, borrowers will not have su¢ cient resources
to pay their debts. Further, there may be capital losses resulting from default and no
way to hedge against them. In this case, investment decisions will be distorted. Thus,
incomplete markets, default, and liquidity are jointly responsible for the distortion of prices
and investment decisions.
Model In this paper we analyze a three-period model. Firms owned by risk neutral
entrepreneurs undertake projects requiring an investment in the ￿rst period and producing
output in the two subsequent periods. Entrepreneurs have no resources and must ￿nance
their ￿rms￿investment by issuing debt, which is then purchased by a large set of identical
consumers. The only uncertainty concerns the timing of output: the project undertaken by
any entrepreneur will produce output in either one of the second or third periods, but not
both. This uncertainty about the timing of production, together with the unavailability of
1We assume that all investment is debt ￿nanced for simplicity. Similar arguments could be made with
both debt and equity, but the analysis would be much more complicated.
2contingent debt instruments, is what generates the risk of default. An entrepreneur who is
unable to repay or to renegotiate his debt is forced to default, liquidate his ￿rm￿ s assets, and
give the proceeds to the creditors.
The bankruptcy code is assumed to require the resolution of the defaulted debt by means
of an immediate payment to creditors in cash; IOUs for future payment are not allowed.
Hence, the assets of a defaulting ￿rm (its claims to future production) must be sold for cash
and creditors are not allowed to use anticipated revenues from the bankruptcy proceedings
as collateral to buy the assets in the market. As a consequence, the ￿rms￿asset prices in the
event of default are sometimes determined by the amount of cash in the market rather than
by its future earnings. The crucial friction in our model arises from this ￿cash in advance￿
constraint, which is binding only in the event of default.
It is important to note that a ￿rm￿ s revenue stream is una⁄ected by default: if the ￿rm
is sold for less than its fundamental value, the sellers￿loss is the buyers￿gain. Moreover,
since all consumers are identical, default does not even have an e⁄ect on the distribution
of wealth.2 Hence, bankruptcy is always e¢ cient ex post and, since the representative
consumer takes both sides of every trade, being at the same time creditor and buyer of the
￿rms that are liquidated, his consumption is una⁄ected by a ￿rm￿ s liquidation. Nonetheless,
a pro￿t-maximizing entrepreneur, anticipating the ￿rm￿ s loss of market value when the ￿rm
is liquidated, will make ine¢ cient investment decisions.
Results The paper presents a simple general-equilibrium model with a representative
consumer and a large number of ￿rms. The ￿rms may default in some states, which leads
to the sale of ￿rms￿assets at ￿re sale prices if markets are illiquid. The model allows us to
focus on the e⁄ects of default on future prices that serve as signals for current decisions. One
of the paper￿ s contributions is the characterization of the conditions under which ￿re sales
take place in equilibrium￿ that is, debt renegotiation fails, default occurs, and liquidity is
scarce￿ as well as of the e⁄ect this has on the ￿rms￿production decisions. There are several
cases that must be distinguished in order to determine the welfare implications of ￿re sales.
If early producers default in equilibrium, they have no future output to sell and default does
not generate any demand for liquidity in the asset market. We call this the case of no asset
sales. Alternatively, if late producers default, their claims to future output have to be sold
in the market in order to pay ￿cash￿to the creditors. If the liquidity available in the market
is su¢ ciently high, the buyers will pay the fundamental value for the liquidated ￿rms. This
is the liquid market case. On the other hand, if the amount of liquidity is too low, we have
an illiquid market and the market-clearing price will be liquidity-constrained, that is, lower
than the fundamental value.
In the ￿rst two cases￿ no asset sales and a liquid market￿ the liquidation value of the
￿rm is equal to its fundamental value and there is no distortion of the investment decisions
made at the ￿rst date. In short, the equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient. In the third case￿ an
illiquid market￿ the ￿rm￿ s value is liquidity-constrained and this will lead to distortions in
2The presence of a representative consumer also implies that the incompleteness of asset markets imposes
no e⁄ective constraint on the allocation of resources for consumption.
3the investment decisions made at the initial date. An illiquid market arises in equilibrium
when the e¢ cient production plan implies a level of total production at the intermediate
date that is low relative to the level of output at the ￿nal date. The form this distortion
takes is quite intuitive. Firms modify their investment decisions (their choice of project) so
that, compared to the e¢ cient level, less ouput appears in the third period (when they are in
default and forced to sell it at ￿re sale prices) and more appears in the second period, when
they are solvent and their creditors are able to buy up the assets of bankrupt ￿rms cheaply.
In other words, they choose more liquid projects, which produce more in the second period
and less in the third period. Both tendencies reduce the roundaboutness of production and
increase the liquidity of the asset market in the second period. At the same time, they imply
that investment decisions are distorted and the marginal productivity of the investment in
the second period is too low relative to the marginal utility of agents￿consumption in that
period.
In the environment we consider, ￿rms￿ investment decisions depend crucially on the
liquidation price of the ￿rms￿assets in the event of default. An additional contribution
of the paper is to show that, even though there is no intrinsic aggregate uncertainty in the
model, it is possible to have endogenous ￿ uctuations in asset prices and ￿nancial crises simply
as a result of the agents￿self ful￿lling beliefs. Suppose that, at the beginning of the second
period, agents observe the realization of a sunspot variable that a⁄ects the equilibrium asset
price. With some probability, the market value of late producing ￿rms is high and equal to
the fundamental value, in which case there is no default, and with some probability the asset
price collapses and late producers are forced to default. Suppose the probability that the
price equals the fundamental is high. Investment decisions will then give little weight to the
possibility of making capital gains when the asset price falls and, hence, will give little weight
to providing liquidity to the asset market in the second period. This sets up the conditions
for a self-ful￿lling collapse in the asset price: a fall in the asset price causes ￿rms to default,
this triggers demand for liquidity (through asset sales), but since the supply of liquidity is
small, market clearing can only be restored by a large drop in the price at which assets can
be sold. The probability of a collapse is small but, if it occurs, its e⁄ects are extreme.
Having shown how market failures arise, in the last part of the paper we attempt to
clarify the source of the ine¢ ciency of equilibrium. We do this by presenting three alternative
ways in which the e¢ ciency of competitive equilibria can be restored. First, we show that
the introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c contingent securities removes the possibility of default and
liquidation and hence makes the liquidity constraint always redundant. The introduction of
such securities completes the market. Secondly, the removal of the cash-in-advance constraint
(for instance, by allowing the payment of creditors with IOUs) ensures that the market-
clearing price in the asset market is always equal to the fundamental value of the ￿rm.
Finally, we show how the distortion of investment decisions can be corrected by the use
of Pigovian taxes, that penalize the adoption of more liquid projects and thus corrects the
distortion caused by liquidity-constrained asset prices.
Related literature The e⁄ect of liquidity on asset prices and its role as a source of
4￿nancial crises has been studied by numerous authors. The e⁄ect of ￿cash in the market
pricing￿in banking crises was ￿rst studied by Allen and Gale (1998) and related themes have
been pursued in a series of subsequent papers (see, for example, Allen and Gale, 2004a and
2004b). Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001, 2005) also study liquidity in a banking context.
By contrast, we analyze a purely market based economy in which there are no depository
institutions and ￿rms take production decisions entirely ￿nanced by the issue of debt. The
focus of our analysis is on the e⁄ects of liquidation values on ￿rms￿investment decisions rather
than on banks￿solvency. Although the speci￿cation of the technology shocks is similar to
Diamond and Rajan (2005), their model di⁄ers from ours not only because ￿rms are ￿nanced
by banks but also because the costs of liquidation are exogenous, unlike in our analysis, the
technology is simpler, and other frictions, such as limited commitment, are present.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argued that the most likely buyers of the assets of a bankrupt
￿rm would be other ￿rms in the same industry. Since all ￿rms would likely be a⁄ected by
the same (negative) business cycle shocks, asset prices are likely to be low when a ￿rm has
to be liquidated. They did not study the general equilibrium e⁄ects of default or allow for
other methods of ￿nancing asset sales.
Liquidity also a⁄ects the ￿rms￿investment decisions in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997,
2001), where moral hazard limits the pledgeable income of ￿rms. To ensure ￿rms￿access
to funds, an appropriate share of the ￿rms￿investment must be in ￿ liquid￿or pledgeable
assets. In such a framework, the ￿rm￿ s future valuation plays no role in determining its
current investment decisions. The role of liquidity is also di⁄erent and the liquidity needs
are exogenous; only the liquidity premium is endogenously determined. Finally, Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) study the e⁄ect of ￿ uctuations in the value of collateral on the ￿rm￿ s
ability to access liquidity.
The possibility of default in competitive environments is also investigated in various
papers (see Kehoe and Levine (1993), Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) for the ￿rst
contributions). Some important di⁄erences from our approach derive from the facts that
default arises from a limited commitment problem (hence is also present when markets are
complete) and liquidity issues play no role in the payments received by creditors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The primitives of the economy are laid
out in Section 2. The investment and portfolio choices of ￿rms and consumers are described
in Section 3, together with their possible decisions in the process of renegotiation of ￿rms￿
debt and, if that fails and default occurs, in the liquidation of the ￿rms￿assets. Competitive
equilibria are then de￿ned and some properties of consumers￿and ￿rms￿choices determined.
This allows us to obtain a simpler (reduced form) set of equilibrium conditions that is
used in the rest of the analysis. After showing that an equilibrium always exists, Section
4 characterizes the parameter values for which equilibria are ine¢ cient and default occurs,
with scarce liquidity. The properties of these equilibria are analyzed in more detail in Section
5, where we illustrate the consequences of the scarcity of liquidity. Here we also show that
ine¢ cient sunspot equilibria may exist, with ￿ uctuations in asset prices leading to ￿nancial
crises. Finally, in Section 6, we show that e¢ ciency can be restored by introducing new
5markets or using tax-transfer schemes. Some of the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Environment
Time is divided into three dates, indexed by t = 0;1;2. At each date, there is a single good
that can be used for consumption or investment. Investment and ￿nancing decisions are
made at the ￿rst date (t = 0); consumption and production occur at the second and third
dates (t = 1;2).
There is a large number of identical consumers (strictly speaking, a non-atomic continuum
with unit measure), each of whom has an endowment e = (1;0;0) consisting of one unit of
the good at date 0 and nothing at dates 1 and 2. The utility of the representative consumer
is denoted by u(c1;c2) and de￿ned by
u(c1;c2) = u1(c1) + u2(c2);
for any consumption stream (c1;c2) ￿ 0. The period utility functions u1 (￿) and u2 (￿) have
the usual properties: they are continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing, and concave.
The good can be invested in risky projects at date 0 to produce outputs of the good
at dates 1 and 2. The only uncertainty concerns the timing of production. Each project
requires one unit of the good at date 0 and produces output at one and only one of the future
dates t = 1;2. With probability ￿ > 0 the output appears at date 1 and with probability
1 ￿ ￿ > 0 it appears at date 2. The probability ￿ is constant and the same for all projects.
Since there is a large number of independent projects, we assume that the ￿law of large
numbers￿is satis￿ed, meaning that the fraction of projects producing at date 1 is precisely
￿.
A project is described by an ordered pair a ￿ (a1;a2), where a1 is the amount of the
good produced at date 1 and a2 is the amount produced at date 2. The set of projects which
can be realized is de￿ned by a smooth production possibility frontier a2 = ’(a1), that is,
the project a = (a1;a2) is feasible if and only if
0 ￿ a1 ￿ 1 and 0 ￿ a2 ￿ ’(a1);
where ’(￿) satis￿es the usual properties: it is continuously di⁄erentiable, decreasing and




0 (a1) = 0 and lim
a1!1
’
0 (a1) = ￿1:
Projects are operated by ￿rms owned by entrepreneurs3. More speci￿cally, there is as-
sumed to be a large number of risk neutral entrepreneurs, each of whom can undertake a
single project requiring the investment of one unit of the good at date 0. Entrepreneurs have
no resources of their own and consumers cannot undertake investment projects themselves, so
3In what follows, we use the terms ￿rm and entrepreneur interchangeably.
6projects are undertaken by ￿rms and ￿nanced by consumers. The number of entrepreneurs
is assumed to be greater than the number of consumers, so the number of entrepreneurs
willing to undertake a project is greater than the number of projects that can be ￿nanced by
consumers. This ￿free entry￿assumption ensures that ￿rms earn zero pro￿ts in equilibrium.
Given that entrepreneurs earn zero pro￿ts in equilibrium, in characterizing Pareto-e¢ cient
allocations we restrict our attention to allocations where all the projects￿output goes to the
consumers. At a symmetric, Pareto-e¢ cient allocation all endowments are invested at date
0 in feasible projects whose output maximizes the expected utility of the representative con-
sumer. In addition, since ’ is strictly concave, Pareto e¢ ciency requires that all endowments
be invested in a unique type of project.
Suppose that a project a is chosen at date 0. At each date t = 1;2, consumption equals
total output. Total output at date 1 is equal to ￿a1 since a fraction ￿ of the projects produce
a1 at date 1; similarly, consumption at date 2 is equal to (1 ￿ ￿)a2 since a fraction 1 ￿ ￿
of projects produce a2 at date 2. Thus, the representative consumer consumes ￿a1 at date
1 and (1 ￿ ￿)a2 at date 2. We say that a project a￿ supports a symmetric, Pareto-e¢ cient
allocation if it maximizes
u(c1;c2) = u1(￿a1) + u2 ((1 ￿ ￿)a2):
among the set of feasible projects. The Inada conditions imply that the e¢ cient project must
have positive output at each date t = 1;2; that is, 0 < a￿
1 < 1. Thus, a￿ is Pareto-e¢ cient if





1) + (1 ￿ ￿)u
0





1) = 0: (1)
The e¢ cient allocation is illustrated in Figure 1.
￿ Figure 1 here ￿
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Overview
We make the extreme assumption that short-term debt is the only ￿nancial instrument
available in the economy. A bond issued at date 0 is a promise to pay one unit of the good at
the beginning of date 1. Entrepreneurs issue bonds, collateralized by future output, to ￿nance
their investment in risky projects. They make their production and ￿nancing decisions to
maximize their ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts. Consumers purchase bonds issued by entrepreneurs to ￿nance
their future consumption. They choose the type of bonds that maximizes their expected
utility, given the entrepreneurs￿choice of project and the market price of the bonds.
Since projects are risky and the promised return on debt is non-contingent, entrepreneurs
may not have enough resources to ful￿l their debt obligations at date 1. In that event they
may have to default. The institution of bankruptcy requires the resolution of the defaulted
7debt by means of an immediate payment to creditors in cash and not in the form of claims
to future payments. The entrepreneurs whose projects produce output at date 1 (early
producers) can make an immediate payment. The others (late producers) have no income
readily available. They can avoid default by renegotiating the debt with their creditors and
rolling it over to the next period. If they fail to renegotiate the debt, however, they must
declare bankruptcy and liquidate the ￿rm￿ s assets (i.e., its claims on future roduction) by
selling them in the asset market. The proceeds of this sale are used to repay creditors.
To clarify the timing of these events and their consequences, we divide the second date into
three sub-periods, labelled A, B, and C, corresponding to the three phases of the bankruptcy
process: repayment/renegotiation/default, liquidation and resolution, respectively. In sub-
period A, each entrepreneur discovers whether he is an early or late producer. If he is an early
producer, he immediately pays his creditors. If he is a late producer, he either renegotiates
the debt (i.e., rolls it over) or defaults. Late producers who fail to renegotiate their debt sell
the ￿rms￿assets in the market that opens in sub-period B. The liquidated value of these
￿rms is paid to the creditors, up to the nominal value of their debt, in sub-period C. This
time line is illustrated in Figure 2.
￿ Figure 2 here ￿
The process of renegotiation and bankruptcy in￿ uences the actual payo⁄to bondholders
and hence the value of the debt associated with di⁄erent types of projects. In particular,
it implies that the value of the debt at date 0 will depend on the date-1 price of claims
to date-2 output. The entrepreneurs￿choice of project and the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium
allocation are also a⁄ected by this price.
At date 1, consumers have to decide whether to use any of the income they receive from
early producers to purchase the assets of the liquidated ￿rms in sub-period B and, in so
doing, transfer this income to the ￿nal period. At date 2, the assets issued at date 1 pay o⁄
and there is no further trade.
Markets are competitive and prices adjust to equate demand and supply in equilibrium.
In particular, at date 0, the supply of bonds issued by entrepreneurs equals the demand from
consumers. Similarly, at date 1 the supply of assets by defaulting entrepreneurs is equal to
the consumers￿demand.
In the remainder of this section we provide a more precise statement of the equilibrium
conditions at the same time as deriving some basic equilibrium properties. By the end of the
section we will have derived the reduced-form set of equilibrium equations that we analyze
in the sections that follow. In Section 3.2, we provide a precise account of the renegotiation
game between ￿rms and their creditors that determines whether, when the debt cannot be
paid o⁄, it can be renegotiated and rolled over, or the ￿rm is forced to default. We show that
the renegotiation game results in default if and only if the present value of the ￿rm￿ s revenue
stream is less than the face value of its debt. In Section 3.3, we summarize the creditors￿
payo⁄s in each of the situations that can arise at date 1. Having characterized the outcome
at date 1, taking as given the entrepreneurs￿decisions at date 0, in Section 3.4 we proceed to
analyze the entrepreneur￿ s problem, which is to raise ￿nance and choose a production plan
8that maximizes the value of his ￿rm. The value of the ￿rm is determined by the market
valuation for the payout of the bonds issued to ￿nance the chosen production plan, which
depends, as previously shown, on the chance of default and the market price of the ￿rm￿ s
assets at date 1. Once the entrepreneur has made his ￿nancial and production decisions
at date 0, his future actions are all determined. It remains to characterize the behavior of
consumers, which we do in Section 3.5. At the ￿rst date, consumers inelastically supply their
funds to the ￿rms that o⁄er the best returns. At date 1, they make the optimal consumption
and savings decision, taking the asset prices and the ￿rms￿payouts and defaults as given.
The last step in our characterization of equilibrium is the statement of the market-clearing
conditions, in Section 3.6.
3.2 Renegotiation and default
Consider an entrepreneur who invested 1 unit of the good at date 0, issued debt with a
face value of d0 > 0 and chose the project a = (a1;a2). At the beginning of date 1, the
entrepreneur learns whether he is an early producer who receives output a1 at date 1 or a
late producer who receives output a2 at date 2.
Sub-period A: repayment/renegotiation/default. Payments on debt obligations are
due in this ￿rst sub-period. There are two cases to be analyzed, depending on whether the
￿rm￿ s output appears in the present or in the future.
Early producers: An early producer receives a revenue of a1 at the beginning of date
1. If the face value of the short-term debt is less than or equal to his revenue (d0 ￿ a1), the
entrepreneur is solvent and immediately pays the amount d0 to his creditors. On the other
hand, if the face value of the debt is greater than his revenue (a1 < d0), the entrepreneur is
insolvent. In this case he defaults and pays as much as he can (i.e., a1) to the bond holders.
Since the project￿ s future output is zero no further payment can be made.
Thus, an early producer, whether he is solvent or not, makes a payment minfa1;d0g to
the bond holders in sub-period A.
Late producers: A late producer has no current output, but expects to receive a2 in
the next period. To avoid default, he must renegotiate or ￿roll over￿ the debt d0. The
renegotiation procedure is structured as follows. The entrepreneur makes a ￿take it or leave
it￿o⁄er to the bond holders, o⁄ering to exchange new short-term debt with a face value
of d1 for the old debt d0 issued at date 0. Once the entrepreneur has made an o⁄er, the
creditors simultaneously accept or reject it. The renegotiation succeeds if a majority of the
creditors accept and the entrepreneur can a⁄ord to pay o⁄ the bond holders who reject the
o⁄er. Otherwise it fails and the entrepreneur is forced to default and to liquidate his ￿rm￿ s
assets, giving the proceeds to his creditors. All this has to be done before the end of the
current period (date 1).
Sub-period B: liquidation. In this sub-period the market for the assets of defaulting late
producers opens. The only asset these entrepreneurs possess is their claim to the project￿ s
future output. Since there is no uncertainty about the amount of future output, this claim
9can be realized by issuing riskless debt, fully collateralized by the future output. The debt
trades at a uniform price q1 regardless of the ￿rm￿ s project since there is no default risk.
Sub-period C: resolution. At the end of date 1, bankrupt late producers settle their debts
by distributing the liquidated value of their projects, q1a2, pro rata among their creditors.
Because of the timing of default, liquidation, and resolution, there is a marked asymmetry
between early and late producers in default. If an early producer defaults in sub-period A,
he immediately hands over his output a1 in partial payment of his debt. Defaulting late
producers are in a di⁄erent situation. Because they have no current revenue, they must
liquidate their assets in sub-period B before making any payment to their creditors. So
these are forced to wait until sub-period C for payment. The delay is important because
income received from liquidation in sub-period C cannot be used to purchase bonds in sub-
period B. This can a⁄ect the equilibrium price of bonds q1 which in turn will a⁄ect the
amount, minfq1a2;d0g, that the creditors eventually receive.
The renegotiation game
Now that we have described the sequence of events at date 1, we can analyze the outcome
of the renegotiation process between a late producer and the bond holders who ￿nanced his
project. Suppose that, for the entrepreneur in question, the chosen project is a = (a1;a2)
and the face value of debt is d0.
The renegotiation game consists of two stages:
￿ The entrepreneur makes a ￿take it or leave it￿o⁄er d1 ￿ a2 to the bond holders.
￿ The bond holders simultaneously accept or reject the ￿rm￿ s o⁄er.
Two conditions must be satis￿ed in order for the renegotiation to succeed.
(i) First, a majority of the bond holders must accept the o⁄er.
(ii) Secondly, the rest of the bond holders must be paid o⁄ in full. Hence, if a fraction
￿ > 0:5 of bond holders accept they must be paid d1 at date 2, while the remaining
fraction 1￿￿ must be paid d0 at date 1 in sub-period A. This is feasible if the budget
constraint
￿q1d1 + (1 ￿ ￿)d0 ￿ q1a2
is satis￿ed.
If either condition is not satis￿ed, the renegotiation fails and the entrepreneur is forced to
default, liquidate the project, and distribute the proceeds to the bond holders at the end of
the period.
If a bond holder accepts the o⁄er and renegotiation succeeds, he receives d1 at date 2.
If he rejects the o⁄er and renegotiation still succeeds, he must be paid d0 immediately, i.e.,
in sub-period A. If renegotiation fails, the bond holder receives minfq1a2;d0g at the end of
10date 1, regardless of whether he accepts or rejects. Let (c1;c2) be the consumption pro￿le
of the representative consumer. In equilibrium each consumer holds a negligible amount of
the debt issued by any ￿rm, to fully diversify ￿rm speci￿c risk, so his payo⁄s for accepting















If the consumer rejects a successful o⁄er, he can choose to consume his payment d0 at date 1
or he can invest it in bonds and consume d0=q1 at date 2. Thus, his payo⁄ is the maximum
of u0
1 (d0)d0 and u0
2 (c2)d0=q1. This gives us the entry in the lower left hand cell. The others
are self-explanatory.
The subgame given by the second stage of the renegotiation game has some of the features
of a coordination game, so it is not surprising that there may be multiple equilibria. In
particular, if a majority of bond holders rejects the entrepreneur￿ s o⁄er, renegotiation fails
and the individual bond holder receives the same payo⁄ whether he accepts or rejects the
o⁄er. Thus, there is always an equilibrium of the subgame in which all bond holders reject
the o⁄er, renegotiation fails, and the project is liquidated prematurely.
There is also a pure-strategy equilibrium of this subgame in which renegotiation succeeds
if and only if
u
0










that is, the payo⁄ from accepting the entrepreneur￿ s o⁄er, conditional on success, is at least
as great as the payo⁄ from rejecting it. In what follows, we will consider the case where
renegotiation fails only if failure is unavoidable. That is, bond holders are assumed to accept
the o⁄er if acceptance is optimal when everyone else accepts. This minimizes the incidence





1(c1) denote the consumers￿intertemporal marginal rate of substitution,
condition (2) can be equivalently written as:
d0 ￿ minfM (c);q1gd1:
In analyzing the renegotiation game, it is convenient to anticipate a property of the equilibria
of the economy that we establish later. For the moment, we treat this property as an auxiliary
assumption:
q1 ￿ M(c): (3)
Condition (3) implies that, in equilibrium, consumers might want to purchase more riskless
debt at date 1 than they are able to. With this temporary assumption we can prove that
renegotiation can only succeed if the face value of debt does not exceed the liquidation value




there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game in which the entrepreneur
o⁄ers d1 = d0=q1 and the creditors all accept. If
(b)
d0 > q1a2;
there is no equilibrium in which renegotiation succeeds: in every subgame perfect equilibrium
of the renegotiation game the entrepreneur is forced to default and liquidate the project.
Proof. (a) The proof is constructive. Suppose that the creditors￿strategy is to accept o⁄ers
d1 ￿ d￿
1 ￿ d0=q1 and reject o⁄ers d1 < d￿
1 and the entrepreneur￿ s strategy is to o⁄er d1 = d￿
1.
We claim that these strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We begin by showing that the strategy of an individual creditor is a best response to the
strategies of the other creditors and the entrepreneur. When the entrepreneur o⁄ers d1 ￿ d￿
1,
all the other creditors accept the o⁄er and renegotiation succeeds even if the creditor under
consideration rejects. Hence, the creditor receives d1 ￿ d￿
1 at date 2 if he accepts the o⁄er
and d0=q1 = d￿
1 at date 2 if he rejects it. So it is (weakly) optimal to accept the o⁄er. If
the entrepreneur o⁄ers d1 < d￿
1, all the other creditors reject the o⁄er, so the renegotiation
fails and the bond holder under consideration receives the same payo⁄ whether he accepts
or rejects. So rejecting the o⁄er is (weakly) optimal in this case.
It remains to show that the entrepreneur￿ s strategy is a best response to the creditors￿
strategy. If the entrepreneur o⁄ers d1 = d￿
1 his o⁄er is accepted, he pays out d￿
1 = d0=q1 at
date 2, and his ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is a2 ￿ d0=q1 ￿ 0. Any o⁄er d1 2 (d￿
1;a2] will also be accepted,
but clearly yields lower pro￿ts. On the other hand, if he o⁄ers d1 < d￿
1, the o⁄er will be
rejected, he is forced to default and ends up paying out minfq1a2;d0g at the end of date 1.
By assumption, d0 ￿ q1a2 so minfq1a2;d0g = d0 and the payment under default leaves the
entrepreneur a non-negative pro￿t q1a2 ￿ d0 at date 1. Since the present value at date 1 of
the expression we found for the pro￿ts when d1 = d￿
1 is also q1a2 ￿d0, the entrepreneur does
not gain by o⁄ering d1 < d￿
1 either. This completes the proof that the strategies constitute
a subgame perfect equilibrium.
(b) The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in
which the renegotiation succeeds. Then it must be optimal for creditors to accept an o⁄er
d1 ￿ a2. But this cannot be, since by rejecting the o⁄er (when everyone else accepts) a
creditor obtains d0=q1 > a2 ￿ d1 at date 2.
3.3 Payments to bond holders
In the preceding analysis we have seen that a bond issued at date 0 yields di⁄erent payments,
depending on whether the entrepreneur turns out to be an early or late producer and whether
12early or late producers default. These payments are displayed in the table below.
Payment if d0 ￿ q1a2
(late producers solvent)
Payment if d0 > q1a2
(late producers default)
Early producer minfa1;d0g at date 1 minfa1;d0g at date 1
Late producer d0=q1 at date 2 q1a2 at (the end of) date 1
If the entrepreneur is a late producer and d0 > q1a2, renegotiation always fails, as shown in
Proposition 1. Hence the entrepreneur defaults and pays creditors an amount minfq1a2;d0g =
q1a2. The other cases are self-explanatory.
A bond issued at date 0 is identi￿ed by its face value d0 and the project a it ￿nances.
The bond market at date 0 is competitive. For any feasible project a, let V (a;d0) denote the
market value of debt with face value d0 issued to ￿nance project a. Given the presence of a
representative consumer, in equilibrium V (a;d0) equals the ratio of the consumer￿ s marginal
utility of the payo⁄ from a unit investment in a bond of type (a;d0) to his marginal utility
of income at date 0.
3.4 Production and ￿nancing decisions
Now we can describe the entrepreneur￿ s production and ￿nancing decisions. Taking the price
function V (￿) as given, the entrepreneur￿ s decision problem consists of choosing an admissible
project a and face value of the debt d0 to maximize his ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts4:
maxa;d0 maxfV (a;d0) ￿ 1;0g
s.t. 0 ￿ a1 ￿ 1; 0 ￿ a2 ￿ ’(a1) : (4)
Equivalently, we can interpret this problem as maximizing the value of the debt issued. Since
entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and there is limited liability, the ￿rm￿ s revenue
can never be negative. The speci￿cation of the objective function in (4) re￿ ects the fact
that, if the value of the debt issued is lower than the cost of the initial investment, that is,
V (a;d0) < 1, it will be impossible for the entrepreneur to undertake a project at all and he
will be forced to remain inactive.
As we argued in Section 2, free entry by entrepreneurs ensures that ￿rms earn zero pro￿ts
in equilibrium. This fact is helpful in studying the solutions to the entrepreneurs￿problem
(4). The zero-pro￿t condition implies that, for all (a;d0),
V (a;d0) ￿ 1 (5)
and, for all projects whose initial investment can be ￿nanced, that is, ordered pairs (a;d0)
satisfying V (a;d0) = 1, the face value of the debt d0 must satisfy
d0 ￿ maxfa1;q1a2g: (6)
4Strictly speaking, the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts should also include (the present value of) any revenue left to the ￿rm
after repaying creditors at dates 1 and 2. Since, as we argue below, the zero pro￿t condition implies such
revenue can never be positive, we ignore this term for simplicity.
13Condition (6) says that the entrepreneur has no revenue left after paying bond holders,
whether he is an early producer or a late producer. When he is an early producer, d0 ￿ a1
implies that the face value of the debt is at least as great as his ￿rm￿ s revenue. When he is
a late producer, d0 ￿ q1a2 ensures that either he defaults and pays out minfd0;q1a2g = q1a2
at (the end of) date 1 or (when d0 = q1a2) he renegotiates the debt and pays out d0=q1 = a2
at date 2. In either case, his ￿rm realizes zero pro￿t.
We show, in addition, that
Lemma 1 The value of the ￿rm￿ s debt, and hence its pro￿ts, are always maximized by
setting
d0 = maxfa1;q1a2g: (7)
Proof. We show that, if d0 > maxfa1;q1a2g, a reduction in d0 has either has no e⁄ect or
increases V (a;q0). We consider two cases in turn. If
a1 > q1a2
the payments to bond holders, and hence the bond￿ s value, are the same whether d0 = a1
or d0 > a1, because default by early producers makes no di⁄erence to the outcome and late
producers must default in any case. If
a1 ￿ q1a2;
late producers do not default if d0 = q1a2 whereas they must default if d0 > q1a2. Hence,
the payment to bond holders is a2 at date 2 in the ￿rst case and q1a2 at (the end of) date 1
in the second. Under (3), u0
2 (c2)a2 ￿ u0
1 (c1)q1a2, and the inequality is strict if q1 < M (c).
Thus, the value of the debt is at least as high in the case where d0 = q1a2 as it is in the case
where d0 > q1a2 and is strictly higher if q1 < M (c).
In the sequel we restrict our attention to the case where, for any project the entrepreneur
considers undertaking in equilibrium, the face value of the debt issued satis￿es (7). On this
basis, the speci￿cation of the payo⁄s for bondholders obtained in Section 3.3 can be further
simpli￿ed:
(i) if a1 ￿ q1a2, we have:
- d0 = q1a2
- early producers default and pay a1 at date 1
- late producers are solvent and pay a2 at date 2.
(ii) if a1 > q1a2:
- d0 = a1,
14- early producers are solvent and pay a1 at date 1
- late producers default and pay q1a2 at (the end of) date 1
Note that the possibility of default introduces a discontinuity in payo⁄s and hence a non-
convexity into the entrepreneur￿ s decision problem. For this reason, we divide the analysis of
the entrepreneur￿ s decision into two parts, depending on whether the late producer is solvent
or in default. Each case corresponds to a convex sub-problem.
(i) Late producers solvent Consider ￿rst projects such that q1a2 ￿ a1. In this case, as
we argued above, creditors receive a1 at date 1 with probability ￿ and a2 at date 2 with
probability 1￿￿. They can use the payment received at date 1 for immediate consumption or
to purchase bonds for future consumption, whichever gives them the greater utility. Because
of our auxiliary assumption, q1 ￿ M (c), it is always weakly optimal at the margin to save the
payment until date 2. Hence, the market value of the debt issued to ￿nance these projects,










2 (c2)(1 ￿ ￿)a2
￿
; (8)
where ￿ > 0 denotes the marginal utility of consumption at date 0.5
(ii) Late producers in default For projects such that q1a2 < a1, the entrepreneur de-
faults when he is a late producer. Bond holders again receive a1 at date 1 with probability
￿, but now they get a payment q1a2 at the end of date 1 with probability 1￿￿. In the ￿rst
event, we can again suppose without loss of generality that the payment received at date 1
is saved until date 2. Then the market value of the debt issued at date 0 with face value










1 (c1)(1 ￿ ￿)q1a2
￿
: (9)
We can formalize the properties of the entrepreneurs￿decision in the following claim.
Claim 1 In a competitive equilibrium where (some) entrepreneurs are active, each entrepre-
neur chooses an admissible project ￿ a which solves his decision problem (4), where V (a;d0)
is given by (8) for projects such that q1a2 ￿ a1 and by (9) for projects such that q1a2 < a1.
In addition,
V (￿ a;maxf￿ a1;q1￿ a2g) = 1 and V (a;maxfa1;q1a2g) ￿ 1
for any other feasible project a.
5This expression and the next one ensure, as we will see, that for every type of bond (a;d0), V (a;d0)
is a market-clearing price. Alternatively, we can interpret V (a;d0) as an entrepreneur￿ s rational conjecture
about how much money he can raise by issuing short-term debt (a;d0).
15Given the non-convexity of the ￿rms￿choice problem, it is possible that an array of
projects is chosen in equilibrium. To keep the notation simple, however, we stated both
the above claim and the following characterization of equilibrium for the symmetric case in
which all entrepreneurs choose the same project a.6
3.5 The consumer￿ s decision
At date 0, consumers supply their endowments in exchange for bonds. The price function
V (￿) speci￿ed in (8) and (9) ensures that, provided c is the representative consumer￿ s optimal
consumption plan and ￿ his marginal utility of income at date 0, he is willing to ￿nance any
project a the entrepreneurs may choose. More precisely, for any (a;d0), consumers are willing
to purchase bonds with value V (a;d0) at date 0 from any entrepreneur who chooses a project
a and issues bonds with face value d0.
The consumer￿ s problem at date 2 is trivial, because there is no further trade and the
consumer simply consumes all his income. It remains to analyze his choice problem at date
1, when the consumer has to decide how much of his current income to use for immediate
consumption and how much to save in the form of short-term debt. In particular, we need
to verify that condition (3), which we have used as an auxiliary assumption, actually holds
in equilibrium.
The consumer￿ s decision problem at date 1 di⁄ers according to whether late producers
are solvent or in default. As in the previous section, we consider each case in turn.
(i) Late producers solvent: d0 = q1a2 ￿ a1 In this case, as we saw, the early producers
pay out a1 in sub-period A of date 1, and the late producers roll over their debt and pay out
a2 at date 2. Each consumer receives a deterministic payment7 equal to ￿a1 in sub-period A.
This income can be used to purchase b1 units of bonds in sub-period B. Since the consumer
receives no further payment in sub-period C, the remaining income, ￿a1 ￿ q1b1, constitutes
the maximal amount he can spend on consumption at date 1. At date 2, the consumer￿ s
income will be (1 ￿ ￿)a2 + b1 and will be entirely devoted to consumption.
Thus, the consumer￿ s problem at date 1 is to choose a consumption plan c = (c1;c2) and
bond holding b1 to solve
max(c1;c2)￿0; b1 u1 (c1) + u2 (c2)
s.t. q1b1 ￿ ￿a1
c1 = ￿a1 ￿ q1b1
c2 = (1 ￿ ￿)a2 + b1:
(10)
It is clear that in this case the liquidity constraint, q1b1 ￿ ￿a1, requiring that the expenditure
on bonds does not exceed the consumer￿ s available income, is implied by the date-1 budget
constraint, c1 = ￿a1 ￿ q1b1, and the condition c1 ￿ 0. Then the necessary and su¢ cient
6The general case, with an array of projects chosen in equilibrium, is described in the appendix.
7This follows from the fact that, as already said, in equilibrium each consumer holds a negligible amount
of the debt issued by any entrepreneur and all projects are independent, so the law of large numbers applies.
16conditions for (c1;c2) and b1 to be a solution of the consumer￿ s decision problem are the
two budget constraints, i.e., the second and third constraints in (10), and the ￿rst-order
condition
q1 = M (c): (11)
(ii) Late producers in default: d0 = a1 > q1a2 The only di⁄erence for the consumer
with respect to the previous case is that he now receives no payment at date 2, but instead
receives an amount (1 ￿ ￿)q1a2 in sub-period C of date 1. Hence the income available to
buy bonds when the bond market opens is still equal to ￿a1 while the income which can be
used for consumption is now ￿a1 + (1 ￿ ￿)q1a2 ￿ q1b1 at date 1 and b1 at date 2. Hence,
the consumer￿ s problem at date 1 is to choose a consumption plan c and bond holding b1 to
solve
max(c1;c2)￿0; b1 u1 (c1) + u2 (c2)
s.t. q1b1 ￿ ￿a1
c1 = ￿a1 ￿ q1b1 + q1 (1 ￿ ￿)a2
c2 = b1:
(12)
In this case, the liquidity constraint is no longer redundant. The necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for (c1;c2) and b1 to be an optimum are the three constraints in (12) and the
￿rst-order condition
q1 ￿ M (c); (13)
where the inequality (13) is strict only when the liquidity constraint is binding, i.e., q1b1 =
￿a1. When q1 < M (c), the consumer would like to save more, but is unable to use the
payment q1 (1 ￿ ￿)a2 he anticipates receiving in sub-period C as collateral in order to borrow
the cash needed in sub-period B to purchase additional short-term debt.
Note that the ￿rst-order conditions (11) and (13) imply that our earlier auxiliary as-
sumption (3) will indeed be satis￿ed in equilibrium.
3.6 Market clearing
Now we are ready to put together the di⁄erent elements of the model to de￿ne an equilibrium.
An equilibrium consists of a project ￿ a chosen by entrepreneurs, a consumption plan ￿ c chosen
by consumers (with the implied value ￿ ￿ of the marginal utility of date-0 income), and prices
V (￿) and ￿ q1 for the bonds issued, respectively, at dates 0 and 1 such that markets clear.
Market clearing at date 0 requires the entrepreneurs￿supply of bonds to equal consumers￿
demand. As anticipated in the previous section, the speci￿cation of the bond-price function
V (￿) in (8) and (9), with
￿
￿ q1;￿ c; ￿ ￿
￿
as above, together with Claim 1, ensure market clearing
holds if
V (￿ a;maxf￿ a1; ￿ q1￿ a2g) = 1:
The market value of the debt issued allows entrepreneurs to raise just enough funds to ￿nance
the projects they have chosen.
17Since markets do not re-open at date 2, the only other market-clearing condition concerns
the bond market at date 1. The speci￿cation of the market-clearing condition again depends
on whether late producers are solvent or in default when they choose project ￿ a and the bond
price is ￿ q1.
If late producers are solvent, they will roll over their debt, o⁄ering short-term debt with
a face value of d1 = ￿ a2 to the bond holders. So, when the bond market opens in sub-period
B, they have no need to issue new debt and there is no supply of bonds in the market. In
equilibrium, the bond price must be such that the consumers￿demand for bonds equals zero.
In other words,
(￿ c1;￿ c2) = (￿￿ a1;(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2) and ￿ b1 = 0: (14)
must be a solution of problem (10). This is the case if and only if ￿ q1 = M(￿ c), so that the
consumers￿￿rst-order condition (11) is satis￿ed.
The more interesting case is the one in which late producers are forced to default, package
their claims to future output as collateralized debt, and supply bonds with face value d1 = ￿ a2
when the market opens in sub-period B. In equilibrium, consumers must now demand a
positive amount of bonds, that is,
(￿ c1;￿ c2) = (￿￿ a1;(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2) and ￿ b1 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2 (15)
must solve (12). This happens if the consumers￿￿rst-order condition (13) holds. The ￿rst-
order condition takes two possible forms, according to whether the liquidity constraint ￿ q1￿ b1 ￿
￿￿ a1 holds as an equality or as an inequality. In the ￿rst case, the liquidity constraint is
binding and we have ￿ q1￿ b1 = ￿￿ a1 and ￿ q1 ￿ M(￿ c); in the second case, we have ￿ q1 = M(￿ c) and
￿ q1￿ b1 < ￿￿ a1. These two conditions are equivalent to:8
￿ q1 = min
￿
￿￿ a1




We can now state the de￿nition of a symmetric competitive equilibrium (with nonzero
output), that is, an equilibrium in which (some) entrepreneurs are active and choose the
same value of (a;d0).
De￿nition 1 A (symmetric) competitive equilibrium consists of a project ￿ a, a corre-
sponding consumption stream (￿ c1;￿ c2) = (￿￿ a1;(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2) and a date-1 price of the bond ￿ q1
such that (a) ￿ a solves the entrepreneur￿ s problem (4) when V (￿) is given by (8) and (9); (b)
the bond market clears at date 0,
V (￿ a;maxf￿ a1; ￿ q1￿ a2g) = 1;
8This can be seen by noticing that the ￿rst condition can be restated as
￿ q1 = M (￿ c) <
￿￿ a1
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2
:
and the second one as
￿ q1 =
￿￿ a1
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2
￿ M (￿ c):
18and (c) the bond market clears at date 1,
￿ q1 =
(




(1￿￿)￿ a2;M (￿ c)
o
otherwise.
Given the non-convexities in the entrepreneur￿ s decision problem, a symmetric equilib-
rium may not always exist. So we can only prove the existence of an equilibrium in general
if we allow for the possibility that an array of projects is chosen. In that case, we say the
equilibrium is mixed.
Proposition 2 Under the stated assumptions on consumers￿preferences and the technology,
a (possibly mixed) competitive equilibrium always exists.
The formal de￿nition of a mixed competitive equilibrium and the proof of Proposition 2
are found in the appendix.
4 When are equilibria e¢ cient?
Now that we have derived a reduced form characterization of equilibrium, we are ready to
analyze its e¢ ciency. In this section we determine the conditions under which the unique
(symmetric) e¢ cient allocation can be supported as an equilibrium. We will ￿nd that this
happens in two quite di⁄erent circumstances. The ￿rst is when there exists an equilibrium
in which early producers default and late producers roll over their debt to the third and
￿nal period. In this type of equilibrium, there is no trade in the asset market in the middle
period and the equilibrium supply of liquidity is irrelevant. The second is when there exists
an equilibrium in which early producers are solvent and late producers default, but the supply
of liquidity is su¢ ciently high that assets trade at their fundamental value. These two cases
exhaust the possibilities for supporting an e¢ cient allocation as a competitive equilibrium.
In the remainder of this section, we use the reduced-form characterization of equilibrium in
De￿nition 1 to identify the parameter values for which these cases obtain.
From De￿nition 1, we can partition the set of symmetric competitive equilibria according
to whether ￿ q1 = M (￿ c) or ￿ q1 < M (￿ c). In an equilibrium where ￿ q1 =
￿￿ a1
(1￿￿)￿ a2 < M (￿ c), late
producers default (￿ q1￿ a2 < ￿ a1) and the condition for an (interior) solution of the entrepreneur￿ s
problem is:
￿









Condition (17) is di⁄erent from the e¢ ciency condition (1) and, in fact, we will show that
the equilibrium is always ine¢ cient in this case. In all other equilibria we have ￿ q1 = M (￿ c)
and an (interior) solution of the ￿rm￿ s problem ￿ a satis￿es
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)M (￿ c)
= ￿’
0(￿ a1). (18)
19In other words, the consumers￿MRS equals the project￿ s MRT, the same as in the e¢ ciency
condition (1). Thus, a symmetric competitive equilibrium is Pareto-e¢ cient if and only if
q1 = M (￿ c).
As shown in Section 2, the economy we have described admits a unique, symmetric,
Pareto-e¢ cient allocation, supported by the project a￿ that satis￿es equation (1) and a￿
2 =
’(a￿
1). The next result identi￿es conditions on preferences and technology under which a
Pareto-e¢ cient competitive equilibrium exists.
Proposition 3 Let a￿ be a feasible project supporting an e¢ cient allocation. This allocation
can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium if and only if either (i)
u0




























Whenever (i) or (ii) holds, we show that an e¢ cient equilibrium exists where ￿ q1 = M (c￿),9
and late producers are solvent (in case (i)) or default (in case (ii)). When q1 = M (c￿), a￿
solves the ￿rm￿ s choice problem if it satis￿es (18), which coincides with (1). On the other


















an equilibrium supporting a￿, if it exists, must satisfy ￿ q1 < M (c￿). As we have seen above,
in such an equilibrium, a￿ is a solution of the entrepreneur￿ s problem only if it satis￿es (17),
which we will show is impossible. Hence we conclude that no Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium
exists in that case. Note that (19) can only hold if ￿ < 1=2, that is, the probability of output
occuring in the ￿rst period is su¢ ciently low.
Proof. Set
￿ q1 = M(c
￿) =
u0






In case (i) we have ￿ q1a￿
2 = M(c￿)a￿
2 ￿ a￿
1; so if entrepreneurs choose a￿ late producers are
solvent and the bond market clears with zero trade. In case (ii) M(c￿)a￿
2 < a￿
1, so if a￿ is
chosen, late producers default and the bond market again clears, since







To conclude that there is a competitive equilibrium in which project a￿ is chosen, it is only




20both for a such that ￿ q1a2 < a1 (late producers default) and for a such that ￿ q1a2 ￿ a1 (early
producers default), we have










2 ((1 ￿ ￿)a
￿
2)(1 ￿ ￿)a2]:
The condition for a maximum of this expression is the same as the ￿rst-order condition for
e¢ ciency, given by (1) and clearly satis￿ed by a￿. Hence, a￿ always maximizes the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts at ￿ q1 = M(c￿) and (a￿; ￿ q1) is an equilibrium.
Next we show that the e¢ cient allocation cannot be decentralized as a competitive equi-
librium when neither (i) nor (ii) holds, that is under (19). The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose (a￿; ￿ q1) is an equilibrium. Then market-clearing requires
￿ q1 = min
￿
u0





















1 > ￿ q1a￿
2,
late producers default at a￿ and a￿ must then be an interior local maximum of problem (4)


















contradicting (19). This completes the proof of the theorem.
5 Scarce liquidity and ine¢ ciency
Proposition 3 identi￿es the parameter values for which it is possible to decentralize the
e¢ cient allocation. Since a competitive equilibrium always exists, by Proposition 2, it follows
that an ine¢ cient equilibrium exists whenever the necessary and su¢ cient conditions of
Proposition 3 are not satis￿ed. That is, when the parameters of the economy are such that
(19) holds, an ine¢ cient equilibrium must exist. What can we say about its properties? In
this section we explore a special case of the economy to get a better insight into the features
of an ine¢ cient equilibrium and, in particular, the form that the distortion of investment
decisions takes.
But ￿rst we state a general property of ine¢ cient equilibria. As we saw in the proof of
Proposition 3, when ￿ q1 = M (￿ c), the expressions for V (￿) in (8) and in (9) coincide and the
solution of the entrepreneurs￿problem (4) is always given by an e¢ cient project. Hence,
21Claim 2 At any ine¢ cient equilibrium, ￿ q1 < M (￿ c) and at least a positive fraction of entre-
preneurs chooses a production plan in which late producers default.
In the rest of this section, we restrict attention to economies where consumers have a
linear utility function:
u(c1) + u2 (c2) = c1 + ￿c2: (20)
The marginal rate of substitution M(c) is then constant and equal to the subjective discount
factor ￿ > 0. As shown in the lemma below, the conditions under which e¢ cient alloca-
tions can be decentralized reduce in this case to conditions on ￿. Equilibria can then be
conveniently classi￿ed according to the value of ￿.




1)(1 ￿ ￿) = ￿=￿; (21)
and has a unique solution a￿
1(￿), where a￿
1 (￿) is a continuous function of ￿. It can immediately
be veri￿ed that a￿
1(￿) is monotonically decreasing in ￿ and that a￿
1 ! 0 as ￿ ! 1 and a￿
1 ! 1
as ￿ ! 0. Then a￿
1(￿)=’(a￿
1(￿)) is also monotonically decreasing in ￿ and tends to 1 as ￿
tends to 0. The following lemma is the analogue of Proposition 3 for preferences satisfying
(20).
Lemma 2 Suppose consumers￿preferences are given by the utility function in (20). Then
there exist positive numbers ￿
￿ and ￿
￿￿ such that:
(i) ￿ ￿ ￿






and, in this case, there is an e¢ cient equilibrium where ￿ q1 = ￿ and late producers are solvent;
(ii) ￿ ￿ ￿






and, in this case, for all ￿ ￿ minf￿
￿;￿
￿￿g, there is an e¢ cient equilibrium in which ￿ q1 = ￿
and late producers default;
(iii) ￿
￿ < ￿
￿￿ () ￿ < 1=2:
By Proposition 3 it also follows that for any ￿ in the region (￿
￿;￿
￿￿) ￿ non-empty if
￿ < 1=2 ￿ any equilibrium is ine¢ cient. Given our interest in ine¢ cient equilibria, we will
focus here on values of ￿ < ￿
￿￿. To characterize the properties of equilibria in this region,
we investigate ￿rst how the entrepreneurs￿optimal project varies with q1, for q1 ￿ ￿. In the
proof of the next proposition, we show that, if the optimal project is such that late producers
default, it is an interior maximum of (9), while if it is such that late producers are solvent
it is a corner solution (i.e., the solution occurs at the value ^ a1 such that ^ a1 = q1’(^ a1)).
We can then compare the maximal value of (9) and of (8) to determine which one solves
22the entrepreneurs￿choice problem (4) for each q1 ￿ ￿ and, ￿nally, verify at which prices
the bond market-clearing condition is satis￿ed. In the next result we impose an additional
property on the technology ’ requiring that it be symmetric, that is,
a1 = ’(a2) i⁄ a2 = ’(a1):
Proposition 4 Suppose the consumers￿utility function satis￿es (20), ’ is symmetric and
￿ < ￿
￿￿. If [i] ￿ > ￿
￿, all equilibria are ine¢ cient and the equilibrium set is described
by one of the following three cases : (a) there is a unique, symmetric equilibrium in which
late producers default; (b) there is a unique mixed equilibrium in which entrepreneurs choose
between two production plans, at one of which late producers are solvent and at the other late
producers default; (c) there are three equilibria, one symmetric equilibrium as in (a) and two
mixed equilibria as in (b). On the other hand, if [ii] ￿ < ￿
￿ a unique, e¢ cient equilibrium
exists.
In all the ine¢ cient symmetric equilibria characterized in Proposition 4, the project
chosen in equilibrium is such that ￿ a1 > a￿
1(￿), thus the distortion takes the form of a project
with a higher payo⁄at date 1 than the e¢ cient project a￿. This can be viewed as a response
to the shortage of liquidity at q1 = ￿. As we see from (19), the supply of liquidity by
consumers, ￿a￿
1=￿, is strictly lower than ￿rms￿demand, (1 ￿ ￿)a￿
2. This drives down q1 and
induces entrepreneurs to choose more liquid projects, that is, projects with higher payo⁄s at
date 1, to pro￿t from the higher rate of return available at that date. In mixed equilibria,
we still have ￿ q1 < ￿, and a positive fraction of entrepreneurs choosing a project such that
a0
1 > a￿
1(￿), but the rest of them choose a project a00
1 < a￿
1(￿) where late producers are solvent,
which reduces the demand for liquidity at date 1. Notice that, when multiple equilibria exist,
as in case [i](c), they are always Pareto-ranked.
How do the properties of the equilibria vary with ￿ in the ine¢ cient region (￿
￿;￿
￿￿)?
If ￿ increases, the e¢ cient output at date 1, a￿
1, decreases while, as shown in the proof of
Proposition 4 above, at a symmetric equilibrium ￿ a1 increases; hence the ine¢ ciency gap
increases.
Endogenous Fluctuations in Liquidation Values. We show next that an additional
type of ine¢ cient equilibria, where the date-1 bond price ￿ uctuates randomly in response
to the realization of a sunspot event, might also exist. The argument is constructive and
general. However, both to illustrate it more simply and to allow a closer comparison with
the properties of the equilibria characterized in the ￿rst part of this section, the argument
will be presented for the case where the consumers￿utility function is linear, as in (20).
Proposition 5 Suppose the consumers￿utility function is given by (20) and ￿ > ￿
￿￿, ￿ <
1=2. For " > 0 su¢ ciently small, a sunspot equilibrium exists in which entrepreneurs choose
a project ￿ a and the bond price takes the values e q1 = ￿ and
e e q1 =
￿￿ a1
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2
; (22)
with probabilities 1 ￿ " and " respectively.
23Proof. We will show that, for " su¢ ciently small, the entrepreneurs￿optimal choice is









+e e q1 (1 ￿ ￿)’(a1)
#)
(23)
subject to the constraints a1 ￿ ￿a2 and a1 > e e q1a2. That is, the entrepreneurs￿optimal
choice is given by a project such that late producers are solvent when the date 1 bond price
is e q1 = ￿ and default when it is e e q1.
Note that the maximum of ￿a1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)’(a1) is attained at the e¢ cient project
a￿. By Lemma 2, ￿ > ￿
￿￿ implies that ￿ > a￿
1=a￿





2] so that a￿ satis￿es the constraints of problem (23) (when e e q1 is set equal to
￿a￿
1=[(1 ￿ ￿)a￿
2]) and is a solution of such problem when " = 0. Since, again by Lemma 2,
￿ < 1=2 implies ￿
￿ < ￿
￿￿ and hence for ￿ > ￿
￿￿ we also have ￿ > ￿a￿
1=[(1 ￿ ￿)a￿
2], the bonds
market clearing condition (c) of De￿nition 1 is satis￿ed both when the price q1 is equal to ￿
and when it equals ￿a￿
1=[(1 ￿ ￿)a￿
2. By continuity, when " is su¢ ciently small the solution
￿ a of problem (23) above (at the corresponding value of e e q1 given by (22)) will be close to a￿
and the same properties hold.
To be able to say that ￿ a is also a solution of the entrepreneur￿ s problem (4) it remains
to be shown that the entrepreneur￿ s pro￿ts are also higher at ￿ a than at any other project
such that late producers default both when q1 equals ￿ and when it equals e e q1, that is, at the
maximum of





+e e q1 (1 ￿ ￿)’(a1)
)
(24)
subject to a1 > ￿a2,11 as well as at any project such that late producers never default, that
is, at the maximum of





+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)’(a1)
)
(25)
subject to the constraint a1 ￿ e e q1a2.12 For " su¢ ciently small, (24) will be maximized at a
such that a1 = ￿a2 and (25) at a such that a1 = e e q1a2, and the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts will clearly be
less than at ￿ a.
Combining the result in Proposition 5 with the one in Lemma 2, when ￿ > ￿
￿￿ and
￿ < 1=2 there exist at least two competitive equilibria, an e¢ cient one where ￿ q1 = ￿ and
10It is immediate to verify that the terms multiplying (1 ￿ ") and ", respectively, coincide with the terms
in (8) and (9) when the utility function is given by (20).
11Since for " small, by continuity, we still have ￿ > e e q1, the other constraint a1 > e e q1a2 is redundant.
12The case where late producers default at e q1 = ￿ but not at e e q1 is clearly impossible, since e q1 > e e q1.
24an ine¢ cient sunspot equilibrium where the bond price takes the values ￿ and e e q1 < ￿, with
probabilities 1￿" and ". In the latter, the self-ful￿lling belief that the bond price will collapse
with positive probability at date 1 induces late producers to default when that happens. The
anticipation of this event leads entrepreneurs to choose a project with an ine¢ ciently high
level of output at date 1, ￿ a1 > a￿
1, to pro￿t from the low bond price at that date. For "
small, the distortion in the investment decision will also be relatively small, but the collapse
in the bond price, when it occurs, will be quite signi￿cant.
6 Restoring e¢ ciency
We have focused on the existence and characterization of ine¢ cient equilibria because of
the insights they o⁄er into the role of liquidity in market failures. To understand why the
market fails to allocate resources e¢ ciently and how the market failure might be alleviated
or avoided altogether, it is helpful to ask what institutional changes in our set-up would
ensure that competitive equilibria are always e¢ cient. In this section, we consider three
remedies that illustrate the role of new markets and of government intervention in achieving
an e¢ cient allocation of resources.
The decentralization of the e¢ cient allocation is problematic only when late producers
default and in particular when condition (19) holds, so we focus exclusively on this case in
what follows. Letting a￿ be, as before, a project supporting a Pareto e¢ cient allocation, this














There are several ways to support the decentralization of the e¢ cient allocation under these
circumstances. We begin by considering the e⁄ect of introducing (￿rm-speci￿c) contingent
claims.
Completing the market
Markets are incomplete at date 0 because it is impossible to make trades contingent on the
state of an individual ￿rm at date 1. Suppose we introduce ￿rm-speci￿c securities that pay
one unit of the good at date 1 if the entrepreneur turns out to be an early (resp. late) producer
and nothing otherwise. These securities are traded at date 0 and their prices are denoted by
q01 and q02, respectively. Now each entrepreneur is able to purchase insurance against being
an early or late producer and to avoid default if he wishes. With these additional markets,
we can show that there exists a competitive equilibrium in which entrepreneurs choose the
project a￿ and the market-clearing price is q￿
1 = M (c￿).
25Let b01 (respectively, b02) denote the demand for securities that pay out if the entrepreneur
is an early (respectively, late) producer. For any project a and any face value d0 of the debt
issued at date 0 to ￿nance it, an appropriate portfolio (b01;b02) can be found to ensure that
the entrepreneur￿ s total revenue in period 1 is equal to d0:
d0 = a1 + b01 = M (c
￿)a2 + b02: (26)
In other words, default never occurs. The ￿rm￿ s debt is riskless in this case and pays one
unit for sure. Let q0 be its unit price in period 0. Since all ￿rm speci￿c risk can be fully
diversi￿ed, the prices for the contingent claims are fair:
(q01;q02) = (￿q0;(1 ￿ ￿)q0): (27)
The ￿rm￿ s revenue at date 0 is now given by
q0d0 ￿ 1 ￿ (q01b01 + q02b02)
We can then substitute from (27) for the prices of the contingent claims in the above expres-
sion and use (26) to rewrite d0 and b01 in terms of b02 when a portfolio of contingent claims
is acquired o⁄ering full insurance against ￿ uctuations in revenue. From this substitution we
get the following expression:
q0 [M (c￿)a2 + b02 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(M (c￿)a2 + b02 ￿ a1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b02] =
= q0 [￿a1 + (1 ￿ ￿)M (c￿)a2 ￿ 1]
It is clear that the project which maximizes the above expression, and hence constitutes the
value maximizing choice of the ￿rm13, is the e¢ cient one, a￿.
Note also that the optimal level of b02 is indeterminate because the usual Modigliani-
Miller argument implies that the ￿rm￿ s capital structure is indeterminate. Any portfolio
(b01;b02) and debt level d0 that ￿nance the project a￿ and ensure no default, that is, satisfying
(26), are a solution of the entrepreneur￿ s problem. Without loss of generality, we can impose
the additional condition that the portfolio (b01;b02) must be self-￿nancing, that is,
q01b01 + q01b02 = 0:
Using (27) this equation can be rewritten as
￿b01 + (1 ￿ ￿)b02 = 0;
that is, the market for contingent claims clears (with zero trades by consumers). We con-
clude that the project a￿ and the bond price q￿
1 = M (c￿) together constitute a competitive
equilibrium.
A similar argument su¢ ces to show that default cannot occur in equilibrium. For ex-
ample, consider the ine¢ cient equilibrium found in the previous sections in which early
producers default. In the presence of markets for contingent claims, entrepreneurs could
achieve a higher value of the debt issued at date 0 by choosing a portfolio (b01;b02) that
avoids the possibility of default and adjusting the face value of the debt d0 accordingly.
13If the ￿rm chooses not to insure fully and default occurs, it can be immediately veri￿ed that its value is
not higher.
26Asset purchases with IOU￿ s
The introduction of contingent claims allows entrepreneurs to insure fully against the vari-
ability in their ￿rms￿future cash￿ ow and hence removes the need for default in equilibrium.
An alternative way to attain e¢ ciency is to remove the ￿cash in advance constraint￿that
restricts asset purchases in period 1 and generates distortions in the asset price in that pe-
riod. In this case, default still occurs at date 1, but it does not distort the entrepreneur￿ s
decisions at date 0.
Suppose, for example, that consumers are allowed to purchase assets using IOU￿ s backed
by their claims on defaulting ￿rms. In that case the total amount of ￿cash￿available to
consumers in the bond market in sub-period B is equal to the revenue received from early
producers, ￿a1, plus the value of the liquidated assets received from defaulting ￿rms in
sub-period C, q1 (1 ￿ ￿)a2. The market-clearing condition now becomes
q1 (1 ￿ ￿)a2 ￿ ￿a1 + q1 (1 ￿ ￿)a2;
with q1 = M (c) if the inequality is strict. Of course, the inequality must be strict since ￿a1 >
0, so the equilibrium asset price will be at the e¢ cient level q1 = M (c) and entrepreneurs
will make e¢ cient decisions. Since the value of the liquidated assets is returned to creditors
in sub-period C, the amount of ￿cash￿available to buy assets will always be greater than
the purchase price, which implies that the cash in advance constraint is never binding.
Government intervention
Another way of preventing market failure is to use Pigovian taxes to o⁄set the distortion
caused by the liquidity-constrained level of the asset price. The distortion, as we saw,
consists in the adoption of projects with an ine¢ ciently high payo⁄ at date 1. Suppose the
government adopts a tax policy that imposes a tax on returns from early producers and a
subsidy on returns from late producers. Let ￿1 denote the tax on the income accruing to
bondholders from early producers and ￿￿2 the tax on the income they receive from late
producers. We will show that ￿ = (￿1;￿2) can be chosen so that the e¢ cient project a￿ is
chosen in equilibrium.
All tax payments are collected (or paid out, in the case of negative taxes) in the initial
sub-period A at the beginning of date 1. The policy is designed to raise zero revenue,
￿￿1a
￿
1 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿2q1a
￿
2; (28)
where q1 is the market-clearing price. The tax imposed on the revenue consumers obtain from
early producers is equal to the subsidy on the revenue consumers get from late producers.
Further, both the tax and the subsidy14 are paid and received at the beginning of date 1.
Consequently, the total liquidity in the market remains equal to ￿a￿
1. In equilibrium, we still







14Unlike the payments from entrepreneurs. Also, the fact that these are taxes on bondholders￿income,
not corporate taxes, imply that the conditions under which late producers default are unchanged.
27Substituting from this condition into the budget balance equation (28), we see that
￿￿1a
￿








which implies that ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿, say.










￿a1 (1 ￿ ￿)
q1
:
This expression takes into account the taxes bond holders must pay (or receive) on their
revenue as well as the fact that the subsidy (negative tax) on the returns from the late
producers is paid at the beginning of date 1, before the asset market opens, and hence can
be invested in bonds and consumed at date 2. This is optimal because q1 < q￿
1. With this























which is satis￿ed if




The tax scheme described above is e⁄ective in deterring entrepreneurs from exploiting
the arbitrage opportunity provided by the fact that defaulting ￿rms are forced to sell at
￿re sale prices. As a consequence, liquidity remains scarce, but entrepreneurs￿investment
decisions are not distorted.
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29Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we extend the de￿nition of a competitive equilibrium given in De￿nition 1 to the case
of a mixed equilibrium. In that case, a fraction ￿D of entrepreneurs choose a project aD such
that late producers default, while the remaining fraction ￿S = 1￿￿D choose a project aS such









the market clearing condition (16) becomes:















2 : xS ￿ xD
￿
and
X" ￿ fx 2 X : " ￿ xS; xD ￿ 1 ￿ "g;











M" ￿ f￿ 2 M : ￿i ￿ "; 8ig:
For any small " > 0, a correspondence
￿1 ￿ ￿2 : M" ￿ X" ￿ M" ￿ X"
is constructed in Steps 1-4 below. Let (￿;x) denote a generic element of M"￿X" and (￿0;x0)
a generic element of ￿1 (￿;x) ￿ ￿2 (￿;x).
Step 1. First, the allocation c induced by (￿;x) is given by:
c(￿;x) =
X
i=S;D ￿i ￿ (￿xi;(1 ￿ ￿)’(xi)):
Step 2. Secondly, de￿ne the map yielding the equilibrium price q1 induced by the allocation
(￿;x):











Note that, since x 2 X", both xS > 0 and xD < 1 and, hence, ’(xD) > 0. Furthermore,
since ￿ 2 M", both ￿S > 0 and ￿D > 0. Then 0 < q1 < 1 and the map de￿ned by the
30expression on the right hand side of (A2) is continuous at all (￿;x).
Step 3. Next, the following map gives the entrepreneurs￿choice which is optimal (pro￿t
















S is uniquely de￿ned because of the strict concavity of ’ and x0
S is continuous in
(￿;x) by the Maximum Theorem. The following map yields then the value of the objective
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D is unique, because ’ is strictly concave, and x0
D is continuous in (￿;x), because





1 (c1 (￿;x))(1 ￿ ￿)q1 (￿;x)’(x
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denote the associated value of the objective function in (A4).
Step 4. Finally, de￿ne the maps:









0 2 arg max
~ ￿2M"
hX
i=S;D ~ ￿iVi (￿;x)
i￿
:
As established above, both x0
S and x0
D are continuous and hence so is ￿2. The functions
fVigi=D;S, being the maximum values of the maximization problems (A4), (A3), are contin-
uous by the Maximum Theorem. Also, the image set ￿1 (￿;x) is compact and convex by
construction and upper hemi-continuous by the Maximum Theorem and the continuity of
fVigi=D;S. Thus ￿1 ￿ ￿2 satis￿es the conditions of Kakutani￿ s theorem, so there exists a
￿xed point (￿;x) for every value of " > 0.
15For ￿ = 1, VS (￿;x) also equals the market value of the debt issued to ￿nance aS.
31To prove the existence of an equilibrium, we use then a limiting argument as " ! 0.
Consider a sequence of positive numbers f"ng such that limn!1 "n = 0 and let f(￿n;xn)g
denote the corresponding sequence of ￿xed points. Since the sequence is bounded there
exists a convergent subsequence. By an abuse of notation we use the same notation for
the subsequence and write limn!1 (￿n;xn) = (￿0;x0). We show next that (￿0;x0) is an
equilibrium.
Suppose that q1 (￿n;xn), the price corresponding to the ￿xed point (￿n;xn), converges to











D = 0; (A5)
or limn!1 u0
2 (c2 (￿n;xn))=u0
1 (c1 (￿n;xn)) = 0; which in turn may only hold if c1 (￿n;xn) ! 0,
which is equivalent to, again, (A5) holding. Condition (A5) in turn implies, since xS ￿ xD,
that xn
S ! 0 and that limn!1 xn
D > 0, limn!1 ￿n



















































we get limn!1 VS (￿n;xn) < 1 while VD (￿n;xn) ! 1; which contradicts the previous
implication that ￿n
D ! 0. Thus we conclude that limn!1 q1 (￿n;xn) is bounded away from
zero.
Then it is straightforward to verify that (￿0;x0) satis￿es the equilibrium conditions:
(i) the values fx0
igi=S;D are the entrepreneurs￿optimal choices subject to the constraint that
late producers are solvent, respectively default, that is solve (A3) and (A4), for " = 0, at
q0
1 = limn!1 q1 (￿n;xn);
(ii) the distribution ￿0 is concentrated on the pro￿t-maximizing values among fx0
igi=S;D;
(iii) the asset market clears at t = 1 because (A2) is satis￿ed in the limit.￿
Proof of Lemma 2
Given the properties of a￿








as ￿ ? ￿
￿￿:
16Since xn
D must be a solution of problem (A4), this is obviously true if limn!1 u0
1 (c1 (￿n;xn)) < 1.
But also when limn!1 u0
1 (c1 (￿n;xn)) = 1; since q1 ￿ M(c), from the ￿rst order conditions of problem
(A4) we get limn!1 ’0 (xn
S) = ￿1 and hence limn!1 xn
D > 0.







as ￿ ? ￿
￿:
By the de￿nition of ￿
￿ and ￿
￿￿ we then readily see that ￿
￿ < ￿
￿￿ if and only if ￿ < 1=2.
The rest of the claim follows by an immediate application of Proposition 3.￿
Proof of Proposition 4
Using (20), the speci￿cation given in (A4) of the program yielding the optimal production




















1 (q1;￿) denote the solution of problem (A6) and vD (q1;￿) the corresponding value of
the objective function, while the corresponding expressions for problem (A7) are aS
1 (q1;￿)
and vS (q1;￿).
When q1 = ￿, as already argued in the proof of Proposition 3, the expressions in (A6)
and (A7) are identical and equal to ￿a1+￿(1￿￿)’(a1), whose maximum is attained at the
e¢ cient project a￿ (￿). For any ￿ < ￿




1 (￿;￿) = a￿
1(￿) and vD (￿;￿) > vS (￿;￿): Moreover, since ￿a1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)’(a1) is
strictly concave in a1 and, when we maximize this expression, the constraint a1 ￿ ￿’(a1)
is binding, the optimal project aS (￿;￿) such that late producers are solvent is attained at
the value of a1 that is the closest as possible to a￿
1, i.e. is the largest possible: ^ a1 such that
^ a1 = ￿’(^ a1). More generally, let ^ a1(q1) denote the solution of a1 = q1’(a1). The following
lemma extends the argument to prices q1 < ￿ :
Lemma 3 When ￿ < ￿
￿￿, for any q1 < ￿ we have aS
1 (q1;￿) = ^ a1(q1) and
aD
1 (q1;￿) 2 argmax(1 ￿ ￿)q1’(a1) + ￿￿
a1
q1; and aD
1 (q1;￿) is decreasing in q1:
Proof. It is immediate to see that if the maximal admissible value of a1, ^ a1(q1), solves
problem (A7) when q1 = ￿, by the same argument the same is true for q1 < ￿. Consider
next the ￿rst order conditions for an interior maximum of problem (A6):
(1 ￿ ￿)q1’




As argued above a￿




1 (q1;￿) denote the solution of (A8) for arbitrary q1. Note that aDi
1 (q1;￿)







3 (1 ￿ ￿)’00 < 0:
33Hence, for all q1 < ￿; aDi
1 (q1;￿) is greater than a￿
1(￿), thus still admissible and constitutes
so a solution of (A6).
Using the properties of aS
1 (q1;￿) and aD
1 (q1;￿) established in the previous Lemma, we
can determine the pattern of vS (q1;￿) and vD (q1;￿) :
Lemma 4 Assume ’ is symmetric. Then for all ￿ < ￿
￿￿, either we have (i) vD (q1;￿) >>
vS (q1;￿) for all q1 < ￿; or (ii) we can ￿nd q0
1 < q00
1 < ￿ such that vD (q1;￿) > vS (q1;￿) for
all q1 < q0
1 and all q1 > q00
1, while vD (q1;￿) < vS (q1;￿) for all q1 2 (q0
1;q00
1).
Proof. It immediately follows from Lemma 3 that vS (q1;￿) = ￿
^ a1(q1)
q1 = ￿^ a2(q1). By
the symmetry property of ’, ^ a2(q1) must also be a solution, for all q1, of the equation















[’0(1 ￿ ￿’0) + ￿’00’][’=(1 ￿ ￿’0)] + ’0’
(1 ￿ ￿’0)
2 ;
always negative since the numerator is the sum of three terms, and they are all negative.
Thus ^ a2 - and vS - are both strictly concave and increasing functions of ￿. On the other





using the envelope theorem:
@vD
@￿










which is positive - and hence vD is also increasing in ￿ - as long as ￿ is su¢ ciently large (and
increasing for all ￿ ￿ 1=￿ if (1 ￿ ￿)￿’(a￿
1(￿)) < ￿a￿





























where the second equality sign follows by (A8). positive for all ￿, hence vD is always convex.
Finally, for ￿ large vD (￿;￿) ￿ vS (￿;￿) ￿ = ￿￿￿
￿
aD
1 (￿;￿) ￿ ^ a1 (￿;￿)
￿
> 0. Recalling that we
have shown the same inequality holds for ￿ = 1=￿; the result follows from the monotonicity
and concavity/convexity properties of vS and vD established above.
On the basis of the previous ￿ndings we can now characterize the properties of competitive
equilibria in the region ￿ < ￿
￿￿: We know from Lemma 2 that an equilibrium with q1 = ￿
34only exists when ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, since for ￿ 2 (￿
￿;￿
￿￿) (19) holds. Also, by De￿nition 1 at a





has to hold and, in addition, a1 = aD
1 (q1;￿) which, by Lemma 3, is equivalent to equation
(A8) being satis￿ed.
We prove next that equations (A9) and (A8) have a solution with respect to q1 and a1 if
and only if ￿ > ￿
￿, and in that case the solution is unique, As shown in the proof of Lemma
3, aD
1 (q1;￿) is always continuous and decreasing in q1. The solution of (A9) with respect to
a1 is also continuous but increasing in q1. For q1 ￿ 0; aD
1 (q1;￿) ￿ 1 while the solution of
(A9) for a1 yields a1 ￿ 0. On the other hand, for q1 = ￿, we have seen that aD
1 (￿;￿) = a￿
1(￿)
and it is easy to verify17 that the solution of (A9) obtains at a value a1 < a￿
1(￿) i⁄ ￿ < ￿
￿.
Hence if ￿ < ￿
￿ equations (A8) and (A9) have no solution (such that q1 ￿ ￿), which implies
there is no symmetric ine¢ cient equilibrium with q1 < ￿. In contrast, if ￿ > ￿
￿ there is a
unique pair (a1;q1), say
￿
￿ aD
1 (￿); ￿ qD
1 (￿)
￿




1 (￿); ￿ qD
1 (￿)
￿
identi￿es a candidate symmetric, ine¢ cient equilibrium,












In addition, a mixed equilibrium might also exist at some price q1 ￿ ￿. At such an
equilibrium, a positive fraction of entrepreneurs choose project ^ a1 where late producers are
solvent and another positive fraction chooses aD
1 = aD
1 (q1;￿) where late producers default.
In addition, the entrepreneurs￿optimality condition, vD (q1;￿) = vS (q1;￿), and the following




1 ).18 Such inequality is satis￿ed if, and
only if19, ￿ qD
1 (￿) < ￿, for all q1 2 (￿ qD
1 (￿);￿). Since, as shown above, ￿ qD
1 (￿) < ￿ exists if and
only if ￿ > ￿
￿, a mixed equilibrium in the region ￿ < minf￿
￿;￿
￿￿g does not exist either,
thus establishing claim (ii).
Recalling the pattern of vD;vS established in Lemma 4, we can now characterize the set
of equilibria when ￿
￿ < ￿ < ￿
￿￿, thus completing the proof of Proposition 4:
1. If vD (q1;￿) ￿ vS (q1;￿) for all q1 < ￿, or if ￿ qD
1 (￿) > q00
1 (which is, recall, the highest















1 < ￿ qD
1 (￿) < q00
1 there is a unique mixed equilibriumat q00












1 (￿) is not an equilibrium.
17This follows from the fact, established in Lemma 2, that ￿ < ￿a￿
1(￿)=[(1 ￿ ￿)’(a￿
1(￿))] i⁄ ￿ < ￿
￿.
18If, and only if, this inequality is satis￿ed we can always ￿nd ￿S > 0 and ￿D = 1￿￿S > 0 such that the
bond market clearing condition (A1) holds.
19The claims follows from the facts that, at q1 = ￿ qD





1 ) holds and that aD
1 is
decreasing in q1.
353. If ￿ qD
1 (￿) < q0
1 (and hence ￿ qD
1 (￿) < q00
1), we have a symmetric equilibrium at ￿ qD
1 (￿) as
well as two mixed equilibria, one at q0
1 and one at q00
1.
Note, ￿nally, that if case 1 above holds for some ￿
0 2 (￿
￿;￿
￿￿), the same is true, a fortiori,
for all higher20 values of ￿ 2 (￿
0;￿
￿￿). Conversely, if case 3 holds, the same is true for all
lower values of ￿ 2 (￿
￿;￿
0).￿
20This follows from the fact that both ￿ qD
1 (￿) and ￿ aD
1 (￿) are increasing in ￿ (since (A9) does not depend
on ￿ while it is immediate to verify from (A8) that aD






The efficient allocation (a1
*,a2
*) occurs where the indifference curve defined by αu1(αa1) + 











αu1(αa1) +  









The resolution of default at date 1 occurs in three stages. In sub-period A the producers repay 
their debt, roll it over, or default. In sub-period B defaulting producers sell their claims to future 




if d0 > q0a1 and roll 
over debt otherwise. 
Late producers in 
default liquidate the 
firm by selling claims 
to future output. 
Consumers use cash in 
hand to buy  assets of 
defaulting firms. 
Late producers in default 
pay out the liquidated 
value of the firm to 
creditors. 
Consumers use the proceeds 
from liquidation of firms and 
other unspent revenue to buy 
consumption goods. 
Sub-period A  Sub-period B  Sub-period C 
Early producers pay
out min{a1,d0}. CESifo Working Paper Series 
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